Ethics, a fad?
Recently I posted a book review on “O God” which talks about Oprah’s spirituality. Like most of my apologetics conversations lately, the discussion quickly turned to morality. I find this phenomenon interesting and revealing. Sure, I’m still operating largely on anecdotes and personal experience, but others have attested to my theory.
No, my theory is not that German’s love David Hasselhoff (and they do, or at least some of the old female ones do). My theory is that Atheist’s love to talk about morality.
It’s true! Theists and Christians in particular seem more eager to talk about the Gospel and about sin. But I’m finding more and more atheists wanting to discuss philosophical and scientific approaches to moral systems. Last year I was on the panel for three “God-talks” at UT Arlington, UT Dallas, and Texas A&M where two atheists and two theists discussed the question of God’s existence and the relevance of that question for meaning, morality, origin and destiny. And sure enough, we spent most of the night, at all three venues talking about morality. Intelligent Design was comparatively small, as was the Problem of Evil, and other heavy topics. We instead spent most of our time talking about Objectivist ethics versus Subjectivist or Relativist ethics.
I suspect that atheists are interested in morality for the same reason creationists are interested in carbon dating–this topic could be devastating if you don’t do your homework. Some atheists try to ground ethics in objective moral values. Others bite the bullet and amputate objectivism. Moral relativism however is not an easy option though. If I can take my professor hat off for a moment, I think we have a love-hate relationship with moral relativism. We like parts of it, and dislike part of it. We hate when people are relativistic towards us, but we love to be relativistic towards others. To put it another way, moral relativisism is that girl you date or you’re friends with, but she cheats on you if you marry her. She’s fun to play with for the short-term, but there’s no hope in committment. But kept at arms length one can dance with relativism indefinitely.
Whether one is objectivist or relativist, or something in between, ethics is an inexact science. And digging out the details can take a lifetime. We sometimes have to bite our lip and just admit that some things remain unclear–no matter what side we are on. Some points of debate cannot be clarified very much at all. This means that one can easiy find “weaknesses” in any given system–whatever the sort–because none of these systems achieve the exactitude and precision we expect from math or the natural sciences.
Also, a blog site is not the right way to clarify one’s entire ethical system. But as a concession to those commentors so interested in morality. Below is a revised form of my moral argument for God, which, incidentally is an argument for objectivist ethics. What follows is only an argument, not a fully orbed explanation of Christian ethics.
Chomp away at this. . .
1) Ethics is the stuff of minds (whether minds are properties of brains or immaterial–it does not matter at this point).
2) Nature is not intelligent, does not “intend” or have “purpose”–it operates in non-mind categories. (without a God, it cannot be teleological–ie: have a telos, “end, goal, designed purpose, etc.” this incudes moral purposes/objectives such as virtues, duties, rights, etc.)
3) Yet there seem to exist moral values that non-objectivist systems are at a loss to explain. Negative evidences include: a) the problem of temporal-discrimination (calling slavery “evil” when it was “good” in its time), b) the problem of bi-culturality (people can be members of two conflicting cultures, but all ethic naturalistic systems are incomparable since there is no non-circular grounds of judging between them), c) the problem of the revolutionary (Minority ethical convictions and radicals are always immoral if “good” is a majority opinion), d) the problem of cross-cultural conflict (no culture’s ethics is better than anothers, even Hitler or Mao’s), e) the problem of subjectivism (no one can call anything anyone else does “evil” unless that person defies his/her own ethical system–even if their system is reprehensible), f) the problem of ignorance (even if many or most ethical values are subjective, there still may be objective values yet undiscovered or masked as relative values), Positive evidences include: a) Moral values are experienced by everyone reading this, b) Morality is a cultural universal, c) Our experience of morality is that there are binding rules that we should obey and others should obey even if they never get caught and even if they enjoy the contrary, d) at least some points of morality are not reducible to simple altruism and the Golden rule, e) Morality is a temporal universal (has occurred throughout time), f) our morality becomes objectivist when we are the victim.
4) but if ethics is at all objective (even in part), then the naturalistic fallacy prevents any natural grounding for ethics–ie: in human minds, or in the rest of nature. The naturalistic fallacy, also called the “Is-ought” fallacy suggests that there is some kind of circular or presumptive reasoning whenever a person argues from (non-teleological) nature that a moral ought follows from it. In other words, nature just is or is not. It knows nothing of what “ought” to be.
5) Binding moral values, which exists, requires a grounds for their existence.
6) Binding moral values then have at least some basis outside of nature.
7) This basis must be a mind sufficient to ground objectively binding moral values within our world.
8 ) By the law of conservation (ie: Ockham’s Razor) we need not postulate more than one supernatural mind to ground said ethics, unless the data set demands it.
9) We (the Christian and the Atheist) can agree from our own observations and reasoning that no other God is needed to ground ethics–so polytheism, pantheism, panentheism, deism, animism, henotheism, finite Godism, are unwarranted insertions (we just disagree over whether A God is needed at all to ground ethics).
[10) Goodness is better explained as an attribute of God than as a command of God (since the latter would be undermined by the euthyphro dilemma).]–this is a side note for Divine Command Theorist reading this.
11) Therefore I know God is good because [see #1-10].
April 26th, 2010 at 8:30 am
[10) Goodness is better explained as an attribute of God than as a command of God (since the latter would be undermined by the euthyphro dilemma)
I don’t see how the former is not also undermined by it. Who is the person calling this attribute ‘good’ - you or God?
April 26th, 2010 at 9:34 am
[…] Posted on April 26, 2010 by chab123 This was written by my friend John Ferrer on the Cross Examined Blog. Very […]
April 26th, 2010 at 4:01 pm
“The naturalistic fallacy, also called the “Is-ought” fallacy suggests that there is some kind of circular or presumptive reasoning whenever a person argues from (non-teleological) nature that a moral ought follows from it. In other words, nature just is or is not. It knows nothing of what “ought” to be. ”
This is true. But I don’t see any atheists arguing that we can derive morality from nature. In fact it is religious right-wingers like Robert P. George who argue for “Natural Law Theories” of morality.
And one can certainly use nature, evolution, science, to explain how we developed our systems of morality. In fact I’d say such methods provide a much BETTER system for explaining it. To explain WHY people have naturally developed a complex system of ethical behaviours is not the same as stating that it being natural makes it moral, so it doesn’t break the naturalistic fallacy..
“Negative evidences include: a) the problem of temporal-discrimination (calling slavery “evil” when it was “good” in its time)”
Isn’t this more a problem for religious people, given that the primary justification for slavery was always that it was condoned by God?
“no one can call anything anyone else does “evil” unless that person defies his/her own ethical system–even if their system is reprehensible”
Again, isn’t this the same state that different religions find themselves in? All claim access to an ‘objective morality’, all may view each other as evil.
April 26th, 2010 at 7:16 pm
Nathan, as for your first response, the Euthyphro dilemma does not offer the option that God IS good, but only that goodness exists independent of God (which I reject) or Goodness is created by God (which I also reject). Hence, an essentialist view of good (ie: God’s nature is good) is a way to split the Euthyphro dilemma. The divine command theory treats goodness as a creation of God, ie: God’s commands are good, which thereby treats goodness as rather arbitrary. –But haven’t we been through this discussion already?
As for your next response, you may not have seen any atheists try to derive morality from nature but I’ve met a lot of them. There are whole ethics systems, such as Evolutionism, which try to derive moral prescriptions from the evolutionary trends of nature (this system is not as popular today, but it was all the rage at the turn into the 20th century). Others I’ve met like to say that our sexual behaviors or our parenting patterns are somehow prescribed for us, in part, by the behaviors of the great apes–ie: Gorilla’s commit “adultery” so it’s “natural” and excusable. Most atheists I know though would not be as bald as that.
Also, you seem a bit dismissive of Natural Law Theory–do you consider Thomas Jefferson or Ben Franklin “religious right-wingers?” These were chief exponents of Natural Law Theory. And frankly, natural law theory is quite the rage in contemporary law and politics, so even if you find it intellectually lacking or problematic, it is hardly fair to castigate adherents as simply “religious right wingers.” I don’t know about Robert P. George, I don’t follow him nor Natural Law Theory that much.
As for your suggestion that nature (ie: evolution/science/etc.) can be used to explain how we got morality–that’s beside the point. Unless you commit the Naturalistic Fallacy you cannot show how nature or even human minds (which are just more “nature” right?) can justify the BINDING nature of moral values. I’m sensing that you are admitting that no such morally binding values can exist at all–given naturalism. Am I right?
As for your suggestion that slavery is more of a problem for religious people, I beg to differ. The chief abolitionists were also religious, namely pointing to the Imago Dei doctrine and the book of Philemon and various teachings in the NT which, taken altogether, point to a higher ethic where cultural slavery is superseded. Look up the history of the subject and you might be surprised. Atheists and agnostics of the day were hardly the pioneers of civil rights in America. Some A&A were involved in early american revolutions and in women’s suffrage, but some were also involved in communist takeovers around the globe. What’s your point? Its a rather lazy response to accuse Christianity of advocating slavery, when slavery was already extant, without Christianity, in most cultures around the world. It wasn’t until Christian churches banded together, and free-speech, voting, and many of the uniquely Western European and later American freedom’s arose in our collective cultures, together with community activism (usually through churches) in large part because of the innovative influence of Judeo-Christian westernism that society built up enough steam to abolish slavery and achieve voting rights for women. Try to name a modern country that is predominately Jewish, Christian or both that boasts of chattel slavery or refuses women’s suffrage.
Plus, given your seeming admission that moral values are not derived from nature, you seem to be admitting that nature cannot ground objective morality.
As for your last point, religions indeed do make conflicting claims on truth. What’s your point? So do politicians, sociologists, scientists. And some of them even call their opponents evil. Varieties of opinion doesn’t prove or disprove anything about the facts. Just because you seem willing to embrace relativism doesn’t make relativism any more successful at answering this rebuttal.
Your responses seem to be some kind of Tu Quoque Fallacy (hypocrisy fallacy), which basically means you are saying, “Yeah, well, your’s isn’t any better.” Sure, there is a place for that kind of challenge, but I wasn’t developing that argument at that point. It’s not a fault of (that part of) my argument if it proves only what it was intended to prove. Instead of rebutting my point you accuse objectivism of the same problem. Your claim may or may not be correct. While you gather your argument in that vein, I will consider my point proven. Moral Relativism cannot mediate between subjective moral disagreements.
April 26th, 2010 at 9:06 pm
John,
On the first point, I don’t really understand your answer (not to say it’s not good, I just don’t know). Nathan’s question was ‘who is labeling the attribute “good” you or G-d.
What is the simple one word answer?
On the topic of slavery I am not sure what Nathan was saying, but I understood something different than you. (My understanding was a concern I share, so perhaps I superimposed that meaning on his words.)
If it wasn’t for slavery, I would see the moral argument as pretty well bulletproof.
Here is the problem I see though. If there is a natural law, a law that G-d has written on our hearts (and this is something I personally feel exists in my own heart; I have a conscience and I know right from wrong, even though I often do wrong). Then this would be something constant. Something unchanged. An eternal natural law.
This at times proves true. We all agree, throughout history and throughout various cultures that murder is wrong. There are other examples. (I am excluding sociopaths, of course.)
Yet slavery shows us a different case. We have record of societies, including American society which saw nothing wrong with the terror that is slavery. Even the Holy Bible gives guidence on how a slave should be treated (and even says a master can beat a slave, in some interpretation to a slow death, and certainly into a coma, because the slave is his property).
Do you know how badly this conflicts with the natural law I feel?
Why did those people, those societies have a different law written on their hearts?
It begins to feel like no eternal law at all.
If it changes, then what confidence do you or I have that the natural law we feel (I bet you and I would agree on 99.9 % of moral matters) is actually right?
What if people look at us 200 years from now and say “what monsters!”
All because of something over which our conscience gives us no trouble?
Thanks,
Luke
(Sorry for any typos. I wrote this on my phone and it has odd autocorrects, and I can’t see more than the previous line.)
April 27th, 2010 at 3:48 am
“who is labeling the attribute “good” you or G-d.”–this is a fallacious complex question. It’s asking two question at once, and demanding a one-word answer (thereby granting the built-in presumption).
1) Is “good” a label attached to an attribute?
2) Who is doing the labeling?
Also, it’s a false dichotomy. It disallows other options such as, “Both” or “Someone/thing else.”
Lastly, if you mean by label “recognize” then I’m okay with saying both humanity and God recognize his goodness, and so could term God “Good.” If you want to call that a “label” I’m okay with that. But your previous question was too loaded to be answered outright.
If however you do not mean “recognize” or something close to it, then I’m afraid I can’t answer your question as is. When parsed out though, I answer 1) no, good is not a mere label for a given attribute. We may use the term “good” for what indeed is good, or mistakenly for what is not-good. But if there is a metaphysically real attribute of God that is goodness then our “labeling” is unrelated to it, since a label of “good” does not make it so. And God would only call his own goodness “good” because he is metaphysically good already, and linguistic/epistemological assessments (Like,” I, God, am good.”) are causally superfluous (ie: God is already good ontologically prior to saying, “I am good”). Goodness is a metaphysical category, not a linguistic category, so terms like “label” sound trivial and distracting to me. That’s why I used a metaphysical, causal-inference, type of argument and not simply linguistic analysis.
April 27th, 2010 at 4:22 am
“Just because you seem willing to embrace relativism doesn’t make relativism any more successful at answering this rebuttal.”
Hi John, I think you’re confusing my posts with someone else’s. I never embraced relativism.
And I still don’t think you’ve answered my and Luke’s question. You said God is good. What do you mean?
“Others I’ve met like to say that our sexual behaviors or our parenting patterns are somehow prescribed for us, in part, by the behaviors of the great apes”
Saying that our behaviour can be explained like this isn’t the same as excusing it. Again, I’ve not heard anyone doing the latter, and am tempted to believe that you have just confused the two things when people have explained their views to you.
April 27th, 2010 at 8:46 am
Hi Folks,
Been on the road for a while and have not participated, but I am glad John has made a few posts. I am learning from the conversation. Thanks.
Question for Nathan. I seem to remember from an exchange that we had a couple of years ago that you reject objective morality. Have you changed your mind now? Are you saying there IS an objective morality? If so, what is your grounding for that?
Blessings,
Frank
April 27th, 2010 at 9:27 am
(I will post several separate posts, just to help keep things more clear. The first is one I intended to post early yesterday.)
John,
Let me just copy what I wrote in the other thread, since this one is more specifically made for the topic.
I. Oughts in nature
As far as the “is-ought” fallacy you mention. You are saying that if nature is all there is, then there can be no “ought.” Is that correct?
I am not sure I believe this (but I’m open to your view). Let me offer an example (I don’t intend it to be crude, I just think it’s something to which we can all relate).
Let’s say that I just drank a gallon of water. Now I really have to pee. Are you saying there is no natural ground whatsoever to say: “I ought to pee.” That only if there is a G-d is peeing a better option then not peeing?
II. You say that the “devastating” problem with the naturalistic view of ethics is presented by the is-ought fallacy.
You said: However, I could ask, “What’s wrong with harming people?” It causes pain, perhaps – but then what’s wrong with pain? People usually don’t like pain – but then what’s wrong with doing what people don’t like? – It’s unpopular, perhaps, but what’s wrong with being unpopular?–etc etc.
Does the exact same problem not exist in a theistic view of ethics?
I could ask: “What’s wrong with harming people?” It causes pain, perhaps–but then what’s wrong with pain? People usually don’t like pain–but then what’s wrong with doing what people don’t like? Well, G-d doesn’t like it? What’s wrong with doing things G-d doesn’t like? -etc, etc.
(One answer to the last question is that G-d can punish you, or being all-powerful enforce his will, but then you arrive at a simple show of force that you decry?)
As I said, you guys are smarter than me, but I don’t see at all how introducing G-d helps. The problem is just as “devastating” to your view, at least with the information I have now.
III. In this thread you say “Goodness is better explained as an attribute” of G-d.
What goodness are you referring to? The goodness you see in the world? Or something else?
Thanks,
Luke
April 27th, 2010 at 9:51 am
John Ferrer said:this is a fallacious complex question… and demanding a one-word answer.
Johh,
I am sorry if I offended you. The question was not intended to be fallacious, and I was certainly trying to ask politely and not demand anything.
All I am trying to say is that I don’t understand what you’re trying to say, and I would like to understand. I am simply trying to ask you to put it in much more simple terms. That’s all. Sorry if it came off wrong. As I said, it was not intended as either fallacious or demanding,
I am tempted to leave this topic (of goodness) since we don’t seem to be communicating well, but let me try another approach, as I’d really like to understand what you’re saying.
Here is a list of various meaning of the word good from Webster’s Dictionary. Which of these meanings, if any, do you intend to communicate when you say “G-d is good?”
1. Of a favorable character or tendency
2. Bountiful, Fertile
3. Handsome, Attractive
4. Suitable, Fit (Good to eat)
5. Free from injury or disease
6. Not Depreciated
7. Can be relied on
8. Profitable, Adventageous
9. Agreeable, Pleasant
10. Salutary, Wholesome (good for a cold)
11. Amusing, Clever (a good joke)
12. of a noticeable size or quantity
13. Considerable (won by a good margin)
14. Full (waited a good hour)
15. Well-founded, Cogent (good reasons)
16. True (holds good for a society at large)
17. Honorable (in good standing)
18. Adequate, Satisfactory
19. Choice, Discriminating
20. Virtuous, Right, Commendable
21. Kind, Benevolnet
22. Upper Class
23. Competent, Skillful
24. Loyal (a good party man)
25. Close (a good friend)
Maybe we can start there and find something to build on.
Thanks,
Luke
April 27th, 2010 at 9:52 am
(Sorry for misspelling your name above.)
April 27th, 2010 at 12:56 pm
Frank, the only thing possibly that’s changed in my mind over the past two years on this issue is that I decided that positing a God would make no difference to the existence or otherwise of an objective morality. Luke explains why pretty well above, in the section of his post beginning “You said: However, I could ask”
Moral ideas seems to require a criteria. Given a criteria, a definition of ‘good’ or ‘moral’, then sure we can have an objective morality. And if two people agree on the criteria, if they share values, then they can work out what the objectively moral course to take in a given situation is. Given what we both value, we can certainly decry an Inca tribe that practiced child sacrifice.
But you need that criteria.
April 27th, 2010 at 4:39 pm
no, good is not a mere label for a given attribute. We may use the term “good” for what indeed is good, or mistakenly for what is not-good. But if there is a metaphysically real attribute of God that is goodness then our “labeling” is unrelated to it, since a label of “good” does not make it so. And God would only call his own goodness “good” because he is metaphysically good already, and linguistic/epistemological assessments (Like,” I, God, am good.”) are causally superfluous (ie: God is already good ontologically prior to saying, “I am good”)
Here, it seems to me that you’ve established that god’s “goodness” is completely different from any current understanding of “good” which humans have in a practical sense, such as the ones laid out in Luke’s post on April 27th, 2010 at 9:51 am.
April 27th, 2010 at 9:08 pm
“1. Of a favorable character or tendency” - “.. in which it is impossible for God to lie…” Hebrews 6:18
)
“2. Bountiful, Fertile” - “He that hath a bountiful eye shall be BLESSED (by The LORD); for he giveth of his bread to the poor.”
“3. Handsome, Attractive” - God is spirit and when He manifest himself in Jesus, it is said that He wasn’t so beautiful. Can’t win ‘em all.
“4. Suitable, Fit (Good to eat)” - “.. and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.” Jo. 6:51 Sounds pretty “tasty” to me!
“5. Free from injury or disease” - Again, He’s a spirit but, when He came here in the flesh He was sacrificed for our sakes - you decide if that was a good thing or not…
“6. Not Depreciated” - “But the LORD shall endure for ever: he hath prepared his throne for judgment.” Psa. 9:7
“7. Can be relied on” - “..and the children of Judah prevailed, because they relied upon the LORD God of their fathers.” 2 Chr. 13:18
“8. Profitable, Adventageous(sic)” - “..godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.” 1 Ti. 4:8
“9. Agreeable, Pleasant” - “..Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart.” Psa. 73 :1 (no wonder libs are pro-Palestinian
“10. Salutary, Wholesome (good for a cold)” - “…and great multitudes followed (Jesus), and he healed them all..” Mat. 12:15
“11. Amusing, Clever (a good joke)” - “..Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!” John 1:47
“12. of a noticeable size or quantity” - “..the LORD God made the earth and the heavens” Pretty big, huh?
“13. Considerable (won by a good margin)” - “He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord GOD will wipe away tears from off all faces..” Isa 25:8
“14. Full (waited a good hour)” - “Now the God of patience and consolation grant you to be likeminded one toward another according to Christ Jesus:” Rom 15:5
“15. Well-founded, Cogent (good reasons)” - “The LORD by wisdom hath founded the earth; by understanding hath he established the heavens.” Pro 3:19
“16. True (holds good for a society at large)” - “Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God is one LORD” Deu 6:4 (trinitarian silliness aside, deep down, most know this is true)
“17. Honorable (in good standing)” - “I will call upon the LORD, who is worthy to be praised: so shall I be saved from mine enemies.” Psa 18:3
“18. Adequate, Satisfactory” - “…My grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made perfect in weakness.” 2 Cor 12:9
“19. Choice, Discriminating” - “And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left.” Mat 25:33
“20. Virtuous, Right, Commendable” - “But as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive.” Gen 50:20
“21. Kind, Benevolnet (sic)” - “Hear me, O LORD; for thy lovingkindness is good: turn unto me according to the multitude of thy tender mercies.” Psa 69:16
“22. Upper Class” - Hello? He’s God!
“23. Competent, Skillful” - “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.”
“24. Loyal (a good party man)” - “God is faithful, by whom ye were called unto the fellowship of his Son Jesus Christ our Lord.” 1 Cor 1:9
“25. Close (a good friend)” - “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Joh 15:13 …and so He did
These are but a small sample of the reasons why my God is a good god.
April 27th, 2010 at 10:28 pm
^Well, if *the Bible says so*….
:/
April 28th, 2010 at 2:03 am
“Here, it seems to me that you’ve established that god’s “goodness” is completely different from any current understanding of “good” which humans have in a practical sense”
Indeed. Why even call it ‘good’? If you were giving it a different name, how would you explain or define its meaning to me?
April 28th, 2010 at 8:17 am
Nathan:
You wrote: “Moral ideas seems to require a criteria. Given a criteria, a definition of ‘good’ or ‘moral’, then sure we can have an objective morality. And if two people agree on the criteria, if they share values, then they can work out what the objectively moral course to take in a given situation is. Given what we both value, we can certainly decry an Inca tribe that practiced child sacrifice. But you need that criteria.”
If two Incas agree on child sacrifice, does that make child sacrifice an objectively good moral thing to do?
Blessings,
Frank
April 28th, 2010 at 9:40 am
Dr. Turek,
Along the lines of your question to Nathan and my earlier post (Apr 26, 9:06pm).
Do you think in 250 years, someone will write about something you and I think is perfectly moral and acceptable in the way you’ve written about Inca child sacrifice?
(Or the way we could write about 2 Americans 250 years ago, being completely oblivious to the fact that there could be something wrong or immoral with slavery.)
In other words, are you certain that the objective moral laws which you’ve ascertained are indeed the right ones?
Thanks,
Luke
April 28th, 2010 at 10:06 am
“If two Incas agree on child sacrifice, does that make child sacrifice an objectively good moral thing to do?”
You’d need to define the criteria by which you were judging and defining ‘good’ in order to answer that question.
April 28th, 2010 at 10:58 am
Frank,
Have you inadvertently brought up the idea of child sacrifice as a red herring? The idea that it’s a child clouds the discussion with emotional response. What you really should be asking is, “Is it objectively moral to take someone’s life?” Who’s life is taken, whether elderly, young, or infant isn’t relevant when the base issue is the taking of life. If there are objective morals then it would seem that killing should be either right or wrong regardless of age. One might start throwing in the circumstances of killing, but in terms of religion, where one believes in a god that gives objective morals, and that their god clearly has stated, “Thou shalt not kill,” would it not be wrong to kill regardless of circumstances? Who cares if it could be called self-defense? It clearly says, “Thou shalt not kill.” It doesn’t give exceptions. So the religious one being attacked, knowing that killing is wrong, knowing that they’ll have an afterlife, shouldn’t kill their attacker.
“If two Incas agree on child sacrifice, does that make child sacrifice an objectively good moral thing to do?”
It does to the Incas who would argue with you that their god(s) have prescribed this to them. You’re not actually saying anything about their objective morality, you’re simply dismissing their religion.
April 28th, 2010 at 5:41 pm
If two Incas agree on child sacrifice, does that make child sacrifice an objectively good moral thing to do?
I’ve never understood why people adopt this viewpoint. If I don’t believe in objective morality, then how would *anything* make *anything* “objectively good” to me in a moral sense? That would require that I believe in an objective sense of morality.
April 28th, 2010 at 9:34 pm
Tim,
Dr. Turek was referring to Nathan’s comment above.
Given a criteria, a definition of ‘good’ or ‘moral’, then sure we can have an objective morality. And if two people agree on the criteria, if they share values, then they can work out what the objectively moral course to take in a given situation is.
That statement is what led to Dr. Turek’s question.
April 28th, 2010 at 9:35 pm
Uh, everyone always knew slavery was a raw deal -that’s why slaves were looked down on by the cruel and felt for by the kind. You know, it’s an exact analogy of how the left (Obama, you guys, etc.) look at tax paying, law abiding citizens as opposed to how you view their masters: illegal aliens, “Big Brother”, etc.
In that^ case, however, the Spirit of God would represent “the kind” as there is no one looking out for law abiding citizens. Accept Jesus -and themselves- that is.
April 28th, 2010 at 9:44 pm
“You know, it’s an exact analogy of how the left (Obama, you guys, etc.) look at tax paying, law abiding citizens as opposed to how you view their masters: illegal aliens, “Big Brother”, etc.”
What are you blathering about now? Peddle this political martyr complex garage elsewhere.
April 29th, 2010 at 2:16 am
Hey, Toby, your “garage” or mine? GRR!
)
(sorry, just trying to relate to you of the pro-SSM crowd
April 29th, 2010 at 4:35 pm
A few points of clarification are in order:
1) Not every “ought” is a moral “ought”
–If I want to go to California from Texas I OUGHT to go West. But that’s only a hypothetical (if…then) imperative, and not a moral imperative. Likewise, If I want to relieve myself after drinking a gallon of water I OUGHT to relieve myself. Again, that is not a moral ought. That is a hypothetical imperative, conditional on whether I would prefer not to explode. There is no moral reason not to refrain and die–unless there is some grounding for objectively binding moral values whereby human life, even my own, SHOULD be preserved or sacrificed.
2) Objectively binding moral values are at issue.
–It is not enough to point to objective data involved in a purported “moral” situation. One must trace the binding force of that “ought” to objective grounds as well. It matters little whether a group of people in the same language game agree to call one thing good and another thing bad. The binding force in that case is only culturally/group relative. We are not debating simply what we choose to call good, but rather trying to identify if there is need for grounding should there be some kind of real “good” to speak of. In relativism, it is not objectively binding in the sense that we would normally grant for things like–Genocide or Rape. You may be okay with saying that murdering one’s slave in ancient days was “good” to them, but I would argue that we KNOW otherwise, regardless of what our systems of thought will allow us to publically admit. And if we are deemed immoral in some regard 250 years from now, they may be right no matter how many of us agree to call that given behavior moral. Nathan, you’ve only reiterated the problems I was pointing out. You have to allow that ANYTHING can be objectively binding(ly) good so long as enough people agree to call it so.–Conceptually that’s possible, but humanly that is reprehensible.
Luke, the nearest answer to your question that I can gather from your proposed definitions is number 20 (virtue, right, character). But I would expand it a bit and say, “Good is what one should do or be.” I’m referring to a categorical imperative (not a hypothetical, “IF you want to have pleasure THEN do X”). Hence God says, not simply, “Do what I tell you” but “Be holy as I am holy” (aka: “Be perfect as I am perfect”). There is a communicable field of attributes and behaviors of God that we can mimic in part, and to that extent we are being good.
Toby, it sounds like you are refusing any objective grounds for saying that child sacrifice to a false god is evil. Am I right? Dr. Turek’s question was not at all a red herring but an illustration of the logical consequence of (some people’s) naturalistic ethics. If one is not willing to go to that destination, then he/she should not get on that train.
April 29th, 2010 at 5:38 pm
John,
On your first point, I just want to make sure I understand correctly.
Are you saying that there can be ought in nature, but just not moral oughts?
On your second point, if you admit that we may well be wrong in what we perceive as moral, and people in 250 years may look at us with disdain, then doesn’t this show that you admit that whatever morals you may claim are not necessarily objective?
(After all, if you say you might be wrong, how can you at the same time claim to be objectively right? I am not saying you’ve claimed that, rather that I don’t see how one can. Is your view that objective moral values exist, but you’re not sure what they are?)
Also, was your answer in #2 intended to answer my question (or doubt) about the moral argument with regard to the way slavery has been viewed?
Thanks for your answer on the definition of ‘good.’ This helps.
I will have to read through your original post again (which I have found difficult to understand, to be honest — of my own fault, not yours) with this important clarification in mind. (If you clarify your first answer — about is-ought — along the lines of what I have asked above, this will help as well, since it’s part of your argument.)
You missed this question, which I would also appreciate an answer to, if you have a few spare minutes. (I understand that all out time is limited, but I thought what you said was interesting and I’d like to understand it better.)
You say that the “devastating” problem with the naturalistic view of ethics is presented by the is-ought fallacy.
You said: However, I could ask, “What’s wrong with harming people?” It causes pain, perhaps – but then what’s wrong with pain? People usually don’t like pain – but then what’s wrong with doing what people don’t like? – It’s unpopular, perhaps, but what’s wrong with being unpopular?–etc etc.
Does the exact same problem not exist in a theistic view of ethics?
I could ask: “What’s wrong with harming people?” It causes pain, perhaps–but then what’s wrong with pain? People usually don’t like pain–but then what’s wrong with doing what people don’t like? Well, G-d doesn’t like it? What’s wrong with doing things G-d doesn’t like? -etc, etc.
(One answer to the last question is that G-d can punish you, or being all-powerful enforce his will, but then you arrive at a simple show of force that you decry?)
As I said, you guys are smarter than me, but I don’t see at all how introducing G-d helps. The problem is just as “devastating” to your view, at least with the information I have now.
Can you please help?
April 29th, 2010 at 9:55 pm
“Toby, it sounds like you are refusing any objective grounds for saying that child sacrifice to a false god is evil.”
Yes. I reject the idea of objective morality. Certainly history, even the history of your own church, has shown there is nothing but culturally accepted consensus; things that, as Luke points out, in 250 years people will disdain.
The idea of the age of the victim, ie, infant/child has no bearing on the question of whether or not sacrifice is immoral. I contend that using that example is a debating tool. It appeals to a person’s biological calling to protect their young. It’s a cheap trick, in other words. Why not state it as, “If two Incas agree on sacrificing the middle-aged, does that make middle-aged sacrifice an objectively good moral thing to do?” It doesn’t have that primordial punch that saying baby does, does it?
“Dr. Turek’s question was not at all a red herring but an illustration of the logical consequence of (some people’s) naturalistic ethics. If one is not willing to go to that destination, then he/she should not get on that train.”
We’re able to have these cute conversations because we’re in countries in which we’re quite well off. Morality is situational and cultural. It’s tied to the well being of the people. If we would imagine a world where the population of the earth doubled and the results were mass overcrowding and pollution then morality would shift and we’d all be having a grim talk about how to cut the population down, that it’s the right thing to do for our survival.
morality is a product of evolution.
April 29th, 2010 at 11:07 pm
John,
I am re-reading your posts and found myself asking a question I realized I had already posted. If you wouldn’t mind a quick answer to this as well.
III. In this thread you say “Goodness is better explained as an attribute” of G-d.
What goodness are you referring to? The goodness you see in the world? Or something else?
Thanks,
Luke
April 29th, 2010 at 11:16 pm
John,
Sorry for another question (I really am just trying to understand a complex topic).
You said:But I would expand it a bit and say, “Good is what one should do or be.”
So when you say “G-d is good” is that:
A. G-d is what one (a person) should be.
or
B. G-d is what G-d should be.
In either of these cases, whichever happens to be accurate, who is deciding what either a person or G-d should be?
April 30th, 2010 at 12:25 am
Luke,
yes there are non-moral oughts that can be explained without any particular recourse to God. But these are entirely functionalist/ mechanistic conditional “oughts.” It’s not enough to get you to morality though. For example, “if there is going to be an earthquake then there ought to be seismic activity of some sort.” “If this bird follows the normal instincts of birds then it should go south for the winter.”
Also, I do not claim to have comprehensive perfect knowledge of all things moral, so your assessment of what I”m claiming with objectivism is off base. I don’t have to know everything to know something. And I know that punching babies for sheer amusement is wrong, rape for the sake of rape is wrong. And there is no time in history and no place in the world where these are good. I know that justice and courage are good. And these are morally binding objective realities. Are you suggesting that these may change? Or that some cultures can be “right” if they vote that rape “good”? I don’t know everything about all things moral, but I know enough to know a few thing that are objectively binding.
As for your attempted reversal of my reductio ad absurdum argument, you didn’t take it far enough. If I keep asking of the naturalist, “Why” you eventually get to non-mental, purposeless, basic matter–wherein no ultimate objective grounding for binding moral values can make sense. The only “stop” along the way that even could make sense as a morally coherent off-road is human minds–but these can only justify relativism at best, and its not clear at all that naturalism can justify claiming that human minds are even a pothole on the causal road of naturalism. Human minds (ie: intelligent causes) are categorically different from the mechanical causes of nature.
However, if you follow the same line of questioning for theism, you arrive at a divine mind which suits the needs of objective grounding quite rightly. If you keep asking “why” you end up in a loop. Permit me to illustrate by carrying your line of questioning a little farther.
“What’s wrong with harming people?”
“It causes pain, perhaps.”
“But then what’s wrong with pain?”
People usually don’t like pain–but then what’s wrong with doing what people don’t like?”
“Well, G-d doesn’t like it.”
“What’s wrong with doing things G-d doesn’t like?”
But we can keep going to a stopping point:
“God doesn’t like wrong things.”
“What makes those things wrong?”
“Those defy his will and nature.”
“What’s wrong with defying God’s will and nature?”
“Well, his will flows from his nature and that’s wrong.”
“What’s wrong with defying his nature?”
“That’s the definition of wrong.”
“How does God’s nature define wrong?”
“Well God is good, so defying God’s nature is to commit a wrong.”
“Why is God good?”
“He just is.”
“But why?”
“God is an intelligent being, and ultimate, and the uncaused cause and all of that–and so it makes sense that he could be good. But that’s just an explanation, if you are looking for prior causes and such, all I can say is, God is just good and nothing else makes him that way.
“But, what makes God good?”
“That’s like asking, ‘What makes circles round?’ God just is good.”
I know countless naturalists are unsatisfied with this metaphysical/causal argument about the basis of goodness. But it has an advantage over naturalism. If humanity has a built-in purpose–ie: to be and act in certain ways–then it makes sense to call someone “evil” who neglects that, or “good” if they achieve it. But unless we grant such “purpose” (ie: a teleological view of humanity, if not the rest of nature) then ultimately moral statements are utterly hollow and/or arbitrary. The “is” of nature HAS to have design for there to be any goals or purposes for which parts of nature (ie: humans) are morally accountable. But to have design it must have a designer, which naturalists deny.
Hence, naturalism necessarily denies the possibility of objectively binding moral values since it denies that humans have morally weighted objectives to which we are commonly accountable. “Being human” has no metaphysical or deeper meaning than just what a doctor or scientist can tell you, yet these fields are categorically incapable of doing anything but description (or, functionalist “prescription”–see “hypothetical imperative” above).
However, from a teleological worldview, where notions of “design” and “designer” are allowed. It makes sense to say that people are held to a moral standard that they themselves did not necessarily invent. It makes sense that the designer had purposes in mind when making his product, and that product is “good” insofar as it does and is what it was made for.
The moral argument for God is largely an existential evidential argument where our experience of moral designs points to a moral designer. It works best on those who realize how reprehensible relativism is when you take it to its logical extreme. It works even better when people realize how difficult it is to ground objectively binding moral values in nature. Those that are not willing to accept relativism, but don’t want theism, they might find the moral argument for God to coherent but still unsatisfying. Those that are willing to embrace full relativism–well they’re allowed to–but that issue has to be addressed almost in an existential, emotional way, since its logically coherent to reject objectivism. I just find it to be suspiciously inhuman and highly counter-intuitive to admit things like, “We can’t judge what Hitler did since we aren’t 1940’s Germans” or “Who are we to judge 150 years after the Civil war that slavery was wrong?”
April 30th, 2010 at 4:37 am
“That is a hypothetical imperative, conditional on whether I would prefer not to explode.”
So what are moral oughts conditional on? “I should do good, given that….”
“Who are we to judge 150 years after the Civil war that slavery was wrong?”
But I’m not seeing anyone actually MAKE that argument.
“God is an intelligent being, and ultimate, and the uncaused cause and all of that–and so it makes sense that he could be good. But that’s just an explanation, if you are looking for prior causes and such, all I can say is, God is just good and nothing else makes him that way.
“But, what makes God good?”
“That’s like asking, ‘What makes circles round?’ God just is good.”
At least this is finally attempting to answer the question that Luke asked several times, but I don’t think it actually answers it. God is good just because you’re defining him as such. It ‘makes sense’ to you that he is. If I took the word ‘good’ in that and para and replaced it with ‘bad’, would it make any more or less sense?
April 30th, 2010 at 7:02 am
God is an intelligent being, and ultimate, and the uncaused cause and all of that–and so it makes sense that he could be good. But that’s just an explanation, if you are looking for prior causes and such, all I can say is, God is just good and nothing else makes him that way.
I don’t see how being uncaused “and all of that” would imply that something is good….
So I see you’re resorting to the “self-evident” argument again.
April 30th, 2010 at 7:06 am
P.S.
If humanity has a built-in purpose–ie: to be and act in certain ways–then it makes sense to call someone “evil” who neglects that, or “good” if they achieve it.
This absolutely reeks of naturalistic fallacy….
April 30th, 2010 at 8:24 am
“This absolutely reeks of naturalistic fallacy….”
Tim, I think you might have mis-read John - I believe he was saying this WAS the naturalistic fallacy.
“That’s like asking, ‘What makes circles round?’ God just is good.”
A circle is defined as being round. ‘Circle’ is the name that we give to things that are of that shape, something we can see in nature (roughly) or express mathematically. “A circle is round” is arguably a tautology.
I don’t see how this relates to ‘God’ being ‘good’. As Tim says, you saying ‘God just is good’ is just presenting something as self-evident without backing it up. You might as well cut out God and present ‘Murder is just wrong’ as an a priori statement.
“I just find it to be suspiciously inhuman…”
Isn’t this the is/ought fallacy again? It goes against your human instincts, which you presume to give moral guidance. It boils down to your instinct telling you that Hitler was wrong.
April 30th, 2010 at 9:21 am
Nathan, moral oughts aren’t conditional (ie: one’s duty is just one’s duty regardless of what one would prefer, likes, dislikes, circumstances, etc.). I think Kant got this right. But given YOUR usage of “conditional” (ie: you are use the word differently than I am), God’s nature is what makes good what it is. And so, I should be/do certain things because they align with God’s nature.
Also, Nathan, if you or anyone else is ascribing to moral relativism then the slavery example is a reductio ad absurdum rebuttal. That is, if you want to go down relativism street you have to take it all the way to the Slavery and deny any grounds to disagree with cultures in the past who advocated slavery as a “good” thing. Whether or not you make that argument is irrelevent. I’m making that argument against whoever tries to deny supernatural grounding for objectively binding moral values.
Tim, the naturalistic fallacy does not work on a teleological worldview. It only works on a naturalistic worldview. The naturalistic fallacy is not simply whenever an “is” and “ought” appear in a discussion about morality, or grounding for moral values.
Nathan, you seem to be wanting an exhaustive definition of good when my more basic issue is identifying a grounding for good. I would suggest neither of us have an exhaustive definition of good, but only supernaturalism allows for a grounding of good. The “a priori” you suggest is incoherent since moral values are mental things, but I doubt you are willing to grant that mind is a priori basic. Unless you are willing to grant panpsychism (mind is the most basic reality, true of all matter) then there cannot be “basic” or “a priori” moral values even remotely close to a naturalistic system
Nathan, are you disagreeing with me that Hitler was wrong? Lets just make it clear where we stand here. If you are denying that Hitler was wrong then lets be clear about it so we can see where this argument is progressing. If our philosophical commitments won’t allow us to admit what we KNOW morally, then we need to adjust our philosophical commitments. I suspect you know Hitler was wrong, but your worldview won’t allow you to call such things “knowledge.” But I could be wrong, you may honestly feel that hitler was not wrong, or that we can’t make those kind’s of judgments, etc.
If we can agree that, for whatever prior causes/reasons, Hitler was wrong then we have a little evidence base to work with. We can start proposing which systems of thought best explain the data. I would suggest that supernaturalism serves to better explain these kinds of intuitive, commonly agreed upon valuations. For example, I don’t have to tell most of the people in the world that, “Your though that ‘hitler was wrong’ that’s just your opinion and there’s no real basis for that.”
Nathan, your last reference to the “is/ought” fallacy doesn’t seem to have anything to do with the “is/ought” fallacy. Do you know what the is/ought fallacy is–and after all we’ve been through here?
April 30th, 2010 at 9:28 am
“Nathan, if you or anyone else is ascribing to moral relativism”
1. John, I’ve pointed out several times that I don’t.
2. And no, I’m not saying I agree with Hitler.
These two points seems to answer the main body of your last post.
“God’s nature is what makes good what it is. And so, I should be/do certain things because they align with God’s nature.”
Why does God’s nature necessarily equal good? Why not say that God’s nature equals bad? If God agreed with Hitler, that would make Hitler good, or would that mean God was bad?
God’s nature is, therefore I ought… I still don’t see the connection.
April 30th, 2010 at 10:19 am
“Nathan, your last reference to the “is/ought” fallacy doesn’t seem to have anything to do with the “is/ought” fallacy”
I’ll try to explain again then. I was responding to you saying: “I just find it to be suspiciously inhuman and highly counter-intuitive to admit things like, “We can’t judge what Hitler did since we aren’t 1940’s Germans” or “Who are we to judge 150 years after the Civil war that slavery was wrong?””
I understand what you are saying here. I also find it inhuman to say ‘we can’t judge Hitler’. Everything that is human in me cries out against what Hitler did.
My problem John, is if I tell theists this, they reject it as having any basis in informing my morality. They tell me that my feelings are meaningless, that it is only through God that I can reject Hitler. Their argument seems to be that just because my instincts may be telling me that Hitler is wrong, that’s not the same as him BEING wrong. In other words, Is/Ought fallacy.
So I called you out as making the same kind of statement.
Perhaps I misunderstood what you were saying; it’s possible I quoted you out of context. But I don’t think I misunderstand the fallacy.
April 30th, 2010 at 10:44 am
By the way, I’ve been pondering the question of why theists often assume that non-theists are trying to use evolution as a basis for morals.
It occurred to me that some questions can be understood in two quite different ways, such that the person answering can think he’s being asked a different question.
You can go into a university class and ask all the students what their favorite subject is. All say biology. When you ask them why, you get as many answers as there are students. All of them answer your question, but you don’t really find out the answer you are looking for.
So you remark on this to the teacher and ask him: “Why are all the people in this class interested in Biology?”
The teacher says “because this is a biology class, logically it’s going to be filled by students who are interested in the subject”.
The teacher’s answer tells you nothing about why any particular student chose biology, but he does indeed addresses the mystery of a class full of students all interested in the same subject. It would be wrong to attack his answer for not doing the former, when it was designed to answer the latter.
In the same way, you could hold up as a mystery our tendency as a species to abide by certain ideas, ethical precepts, taboos etc, which we group together as morality.
Someone else could offer evolution as an explanation for the phenomenon – of course we develop these ideas, of course we develop taboos against killing children, of course we have cultures of helping strangers – a species that didn’t would die out. We see similar behaviours in other animals too.
And this is an attempt to answer the question, without attempting to make any claims about how we SHOULD act, or even attempting to explain why any particular person chooses to act in a certain way. But it doesn’t need to in order to address the question.
It isn’t saying ‘We SHOULD act in a ‘moral’ way BECAUSE of evolution’.
Instead it says ‘Evolution EXPLAINS why it’s not SURPRISING that humans act in this way’.
April 30th, 2010 at 12:14 pm
John,
First of all, thank you very much for your response. I truly appreciate it.
I. Oughts in Nature
Thanks for clarifying your stance and saying that there can be ought in nature. (As I said when you first said that there weren’t it didn’t quite make sense to me, but now I understand your view.)
You said: If this bird follows the normal instincts of birds then it should go south for the winter.
So if what you and I perceive as morality or a conscience is simply evolved instinct, then you would agree that that oughts based on this can exist in nature, correct?
(I said, if, so please just accept the premise to answer the question.)
There is actually some scientific evidence for such ideas. There was a recent NY Times article entitled “Some Biologists Find an Urge in Human Nature to Help.” There are others and there are quite a few people looking into this.
(I think that article caught in my memory because it started with the words: What is the essence of human nature? Flawed, say many theologians. Vicious and addicted to warfare, wrote Hobbes. Selfish and in need of considerable improvement, think many parents.)
It’s certainly interesting because there is also a selfish instinct (which is need at least in some sense to survive), but it seems that there may be an instinct on the other side to balance it. I think one can see this struggle as children develop. (As the article’s introduction alludes to, as parent’s it’s easy to see the selfish side — it can frustrate and disappoint us, but what parent can deny that there is also an innate goodness in our children?)
II.On one’s knowledge of objective morals
John said:so your assessment of what I”m claiming with objectivism is off base
I think you may have misread my post. I clearly said (even bolded): “I am not saying you’ve claimed that.
You said that you don’t know all objective morals, but you know some.
For example you said: “I know that punching babies for sheer amusement is wrong”
Can you please give an example of something that you think G-d considers immoral, but you’re unsure about? Something you think you may actually be wrong about.
Also, I’m a little afraid to ask, but I will give you the benefit of the doubt and assume this came out wrong, but you said:
rape for the sake of rape is wrong
Do you actually believe that there are things for the sake of which rape could be right?
So what is the criteria for deciding between things that John is pretty sure are wrong, and things that John knows are wrong? Is it just how certain you feel about it? Or do you have some other criteria?
Since you have kindly answered my question, I will answer yours (if I end up missing a question in your post, always feel free to let me know).
You askedAre you suggesting that [the idea that rape and punching babies] may change?
No. Not at all. I personally believe that such things have always been, are and always will be wrong.
You also askedOr that some cultures can be “right” if they vote that rape “good”?
Well, as my answer above should make clear: no. I think some things are wrong no matter how many people believe otherwise. (If anything, I tend to be mistrustful of human majority thought.)
I guess you are asking this due to my questions about moral views changing. (You seem to agree that they do, and that you may well be wrong about some of the morals you espouse.) I think they do change as various examples, such as slavery, or stoning disobedient children show. We seem to agree on all both these points. I think that we’d agree (please correct me if I’m wrong) that there may be things which we now consider to be moral, which may later be judged as not moral, but we’d find it extremely unlikely that something we consider immoral will later be considered moral.
III. Your reductio ad absurdum argument
Your what argument? (Sorry, but I have no idea what you’ve just said.)
As you yourself admit, you end up in a loop.
You end up answering the question “why is G-d good” with “He just is”
How is this any better than answering “what’s wrong with hurting other people” with “it just is”
Either way one ends up with a simple “it just is” statement.
Why is a “it just is” statement “devastating” to a non-theistic view, but not so to a theistic view?
Sorry, but I just don’t understand the difference.
Even if we accept your loop, you still face the exact same problem.
Let’s just grant the assumption that G-d is good. This is what the loop is about, but not really what the question was about.
The questions follow:
“Why is it bad to do what a Good G-d’s nature defines as wrong?”
“Why shouldn’t I do what G-d says is wrong?”
IV. Objectively binding moral values
Sorry, but I need to ask for some clarification on the terms here.
What is the difference between objectively binding moral values and objectively non-binding moral values?
Can there be non-objective binding moral values?
VII. Moral relativism:
You said:I just find it to be suspiciously inhuman and highly counter-intuitive to admit things like, “We can’t judge what Hitler did since we aren’t 1940’s Germans” or “Who are we to judge 150 years after the Civil war that slavery was wrong?”
How many people have you met that say things like this? I have met a lot of people (I’m extremely popular), but have never heard anyone say a thing like this?
VII. Pedigogy
You said that you were a professor, right?
Would you mind emailing me at my private address? (You can get it from Dr. Turek if it’s not available to you through the site.)
I wanted to point something out to you, but think it would be better to do so privately.
(Note, I removed parts of this post so that it would not be overwhelmingly long. I hope this will make it easier for you to participate in the conversation.)
April 30th, 2010 at 12:27 pm
John,
I have another question which may help us get at the root of the “G-d is good” dilemma.
As I alluded to last week (or so), you once said that the Calvinist/Reformed G-d committed “Divine Rape of the Soul.”
Please grant, for the sake of argument, the assumption that the Calvinist G-d is the real G-d.
Is G-d good? (Is a Divine Rapist good?)
Is G-d something less that good?
Is G-d evil? (Is a Divine Rapist evil?)
Thanks,
Luke
April 30th, 2010 at 2:29 pm
John,
A couple of side points:
I. On Euthypro and his dilemma:
I don’t see why anyone who subscribes to the view that human’s come up with morality — that it’s culturally derived, and perhaps based in part on traits acquired through evolution — would see a problem with the idea that what is good is good because G-d says it is.
Here is what I mean:
If Miriam, for example, believes that the notions of right and wrong that weight on her conscience are derived through culture, her upbringing and her own decisions (for example, she has thought about abortion and decided that it is wrong, though at an earlier point in her life she didn’t really know), then she believes in her ability to derive these sort of oughts based on her knowledge, and she is willing to trust that enough to (try to) live by it.
So if she were to accept the assumption that G-d exists and He is omnipotent, why wouldn’t his moral conclusions, which are based an infinitely more knowledge, not be valid?
In other words, if one trusts a limited mind (their own, or that of their parent, culture) to tell them what is right, then why would it be a problem to trust the omnipotent mind of G-d to do the same thing, only better?
Why is it an unacceptable answer to the dilemma that G-d has determined what is moral and good based upon his infinite knowledge? That based on what He knows, if people would just follow these rules, that happiness would be maximized and suffering minimized?
(Not to belabor the point but if one thinks they can come to moral conclusions that if carried out would maximize happiness and minimize suffering, then why not trust G-d?)
Another way to say what I’m saying, I suppose, is that to me it seems perfectly fine for G-d to say “this is right and this is wrong.”
Bertrand Russell may have criticized this as simple fiat, but if we grant the assumption that G-d is good then what is wrong with that?
Now, as I know Nathan and Tim will jump on this.
What I mean by G-d is good, is that G-d seeks to maximize the happiness and minimize the suffering of his creatures.
(The obvious problem thatt Bertrand Russell brings up, seems only a problem if we don’t know the nature of G-d. If G-d could be good or evil, and we didn’t know which, then his fiat could be dangerous.)
As I said, the basic tenant that G-d is good is in the end a matter of faith. I think it is much better to simply say that than to reduce it to logical loops.
I think it’s better to say “I believe He is” rather than “He just is.”
So, to John, I don’t understand why you are so concerned with avoiding the dilemma (saying it’s actually not one, or whatever), and try to explain, in ways which quite frankly don’t make sense to many people — that goodness is some attribute of G-d’s nature.
As you admitted before, your eventual answer to this is: He just is.
If you can convince someone that “He just is” (that G-d just is good), then what’s the problem with saying that G-d, based on his goodness and infinite knowledge told us what we ought to do?
(I also await your answer on the Calvinist G-d because I think it will clear p some of this.)
Thanks a lot,
Luke
April 30th, 2010 at 3:01 pm
II.
You seem to say that unless one believes that there are objective moral rights and wrongs, one could not say to another “what you’re doing is wrong.”
I don’t understand at all why this would be.
If I happen to believe that something is good or bad simply based on my own opinions, why should that stop me from sharing it with the world?
For example, watch this:
There is a small bakery on the corner of Rue de Clichy and Rue de Cardinal Mecier, which makes the best french baguettes in the world (I highly recommend the traditional ones).
Did I just:
a. refer to a divine French Baguette standard?
b. perform some completely illogical deed by stating publicly something which is my opinion and not based on any objective standard?
Thanks,
Luke
April 30th, 2010 at 3:01 pm
http://maps.google.com/maps?hl.....8,,1,12.27
April 30th, 2010 at 3:32 pm
Comparing morality to tastes in bread doesn’t help Luke, as it makes it sounds like you think ‘murder is wrong’ is on a par with ‘I like strawberry’. I know what you’re saying, but I also know how the ‘objective morality’ arguers will take what you just said.
Feel free to email me by the way, as I’d be happy to discuss my side of the argument with you, and I suspect Frank and others would prefer I didn’t use this board to conduct the discussion with you.
You can reach me on ar[at]wlv.ac.uk
April 30th, 2010 at 4:15 pm
Nathan,
Yeah, I see what you mean.
My point actually relies on the fact that murder is much, much, much more serious than bread.
If there is nothing illogical about sharing and standing up for an opinion in such a trivial topic, why would it be illogical to share and stand up for an opinion of mortal importance?
To me, if we accept that one can share and defend a personal opinion about bread, then we must logically accept that one can share and defend a personal opinion about murder.
(And if someone says that the trivial one is permissible, but the consequential one not permissible, then I would expect to see some logical framework for why this should be?)
Thanks,
Luke
April 30th, 2010 at 4:28 pm
Perhaps because an opinion about say, wine, can be dismissed as abitrary. Despite the fact that some people unarguably know much more about the subject than others.
You can share opinions on morality given a shared base of values. That was the ‘ought… given this’ that I was aiming at before. ‘Given we all value x, we can all discuss the most moral behaviour in situation y’. That is the basis for damning Hitler - our shared value for life. Of course someone can say this shared value is arbitrary, but it’s an odd claim to make, and irrelevant too - all that is important is that we share it.
You can say that our agreement that dung is repellent is arbitrary (it’s not shared by beetles), but that doesn’t matter to our discussion of where to eat tonight - a diner or a septic tank.
April 30th, 2010 at 4:57 pm
Nathan,
I’ll just send an email reply to your last point. I think you’re right, and our discussion is not connected to the expressed purpose of this site.
Thanks,
Luke
April 30th, 2010 at 5:57 pm
On the topic of “arbitrary” moral values….I ask this question. Does the fact that your taste in music is “arbitrary” make you any less inclined to listen to the type of music that you currently enjoy?
April 30th, 2010 at 6:00 pm
Crap, hit post before I was done
What I meant to add was….if I feel that something is “moral” or “immoral,” regardless of whether or not that value is arbitrary, I still feel it and in some cases, I feel it strongly. To say that morality is “subjective” does not render it “useless” any more than saying, “musical taste is subjective” renders listening to music “pointless.”
April 30th, 2010 at 6:02 pm
*should read topic first, realizes that his point has already been made*
May 1st, 2010 at 4:27 pm
Tim, did you see Gordon’s post to you before it got deleted on Phil’s blog? It had his email address, and told you to mail him if Phil chucks you off his blog. But it got deleted before I could write it down.
By the way, you really got Phil riled up. Not sure how, as you managed to avoid getting annoyed with him, and weren’t insulting. Ho hum.
May 2nd, 2010 at 11:06 am
John,
I realize I wrote pretty long posts, so perhaps I can aid your response by narrowing things down to a few key questions.
I. If you say that oughts can exist in nature, and one such example is based on instinct, then if we grant the assumption that what you and I perceive as morality is based on instinct, then you would agree that that oughts based on this can exist in nature, correct?
II. Why is it devastating to Nathan’s argument to say “it just is” (for example, it just is wrong to hurt other people), but not devastating to your own argument to say “He just is?” It seems very much the same thing to me. Both rely on a simple assertion.
III. Why shouldn’t I do what a good and perfect G-d says is wrong?
IV. You once said that the Calvinist/Reformed G-d committed “Divine Rape of the Soul.”
Please grant, for the sake of argument, the assumption that the Calvinist G-d is the real G-d.
Is G-d good? (Is a Divine Rapist good?)
Is G-d something less that good?
Is G-d evil? (Is a Divine Rapist evil?)
Thanks,
Luke
May 6th, 2010 at 4:54 pm
There was an interesting article in the NY Times magazine recently. It was titled “The Moral Lives of Babies.”
You can google the title and add NY Times and easily find it.
As I mentioned above there is a mounting body of evidence that babies have what we would consider moral ideas, and are not moral blank slates.
There may be others, but to me two hypothesis go a long way to explain this.
1. There is a law written on our hearts by G-d.
2. We have evolved survival insticts which, like a bird flying south, help us survive.
Anyway, I hope John can make it back to the discussion once his semester ends.
Luke
June 1st, 2010 at 2:16 pm
John,
Come back.
Thanks,
Luke
June 1st, 2010 at 3:25 pm
Sorry I’ve been gone for so long. I had final exams, grading, and an international trip. I will be commenting again soon. Thanks for not giving up on me.
June 8th, 2010 at 9:20 am
Luke,
I would say that “oughts” are the basis for instincts, not the other way around. Otherwise it is the naturalistic fallacy. Our instincts don’t tell us what we should do, they only reflect what we should do(albeit distorted sometimes). For example, our instinct to procreate is generally neutral, and can be practiced in moral or immoral ways even though it is an almost universally binding instinctive “ought” for humanity. We “should” procreate given our instinct to do so. But that is not a moral subject unless the “should” is unqualified, ie: it is true and not merely desired/typical/expected/etc. That kind of “should” is different than instrumental “shoulds” in nature. If I want to go to california from texas I should go west, but that is not a moral “should/ought.” It’s an instrumental ought. If I want to enjoy harmony with my instinctive nature I should procreate and seek pleasure and do what comes natural, etc etc, but that is only an instrumental/functional “ought” and not a moral ought.
If I recall our conversation correctly, we were talking about how the
“it just is” objection is that moral oughts are not hypothetical but categorical imperatives–they are simply objectively binding duties. And this “it just is” notion is devasting to a naturalistic worldview because morality is the stuff of intelligence, but naturalism does not grant a basic enough intelligence (ie: the universe has no designer/mind ordering or overseeing it) to justify the kind of objectivey binding morality that we experience. Naturalism can achieve only hypothetical/instrumental imperatives such as, “if you want to psychologically fulfilled, then do X” or “if you want to be happy, do X”. But these hinge a big “if” and so there is not objective way to justify THAT we should want to be happy, fulfilled, meaningful, etc. To fully enter the realm of morality one must justify THAT we should want something typical of/definitive of “good” (ie: pleasure, happiness, joy, fulfillment, meaningfulness, etc.).
HOW we know such a definition/type of “good” is correct is a different (and perhaps harder) question that I’m not here attempting to answer.
June 8th, 2010 at 11:06 am
John,
So we’re kind of back to square one on the ought/is thing. Earlier you said that if a bird has the instinct, it ought to go south (”If this bird follows the normal instincts of birds then it should go south”). But now it seems that you’re saying it’s the other way around (”‘oughts’ are the basis for instincts”).
I understand what you’re saying in your second paragraph (was this intended as an answer to question II?), but it seems to me you’re begging the question. You say that morality is the stuff of intelligence, but that’s exactly what you’re trying to prove (it is an argument for G-d after all).
You also assume a teleological view, but don’t fully explore the way the world might look without one. You say that we have to first establish “THAT we should want to be happy.” However, if the desire to be happy is not something that we decide, but is simply an evolved instinct, than we are simply dealing with an: it just is.
Let’s just assume it is evolved instinct which give these emotions, etc, then there is no real point in discussing why that is (for the sake of this argument anyway). That is, it doesn’t really change anything. “It just is” is a perfectly reasonable place to start in such a case.
To me it seems like this is what you’re saying (if we grant the instinct assumption):
Naturalist: We have two arms.
John: But why do we have two arms?
Naturalist: We just do.
John: Can you justify that?
Naturalist: We just have them.
John: That’s devastating to your argument.
Anyway, I don’t know how much is left to say on the issue, but I really do appreciate your response.
I hope you’ll be able to answer questions III and IV soon.
Thanks,
Luke
June 8th, 2010 at 5:15 pm
Luke I’m not using a circular argument with the point of “ethics is the stuff of intelligence.” I didn’t give the full argument for that, but it’s no mere assumption either. Let me illustrate with a question:
Is there anything wholly non-intelligent which you deem to be a moral being? If so, then we are either equivocating on “morality” or on “intelligent.” I’m suggesting intelligence is a prerequisite for morality. Humans CAN be moral because they are intelligent. I’m suggesting further that from what we know of morality, whatever it is, animals do not qualify precisely because they have only instinct and not volition to act on. Lions are not morally guilty for hunting gazzelles because “thou shalt not murder” is not something they can cognize, nor can they choose to obey or disobedy. Humans may have instincts, and these may align with our moral responsibilities, but we also have volition to where we can choose to obey our more noble instincts (charity, love, etc.) and disobey our baser instincts (rape, theft, etc.). Generally, instincts–I suppose–reflect something (usually distorted) about our moral responsibilities. But I’m not suggesting at all that instincts are any sufficient basis for morality precisely because instincts are pre-intelligent and therefore they are beneath volition. Only at the level of volition do moral categories enter the picture.
Also you are not distinguishing between generic uses of “ought” and moral uses of “ought.” I’m not even talking about whether birds “ought” to go south, that’s not morally significant and doesn’t reflect anything you or I could call “morality.” People have “instincts” (if you can call it that) to adultery and theft as well as to help people in certain circumstances. But the fact that we have instinctive urges for those things (ie: the “is” of our nature) says NOTHING about whether we OUGHT to choose to rape, steal or care for our young as MORALLY good or evil things. In other words, we have instincts and then volition to decide whether to obey instincts. Animals have to follow their instincts, so they don’t enter moral realms. People don’t have to follow their instincts so it makes sense to ask whether it is good or evil to follow an instinct to rape or steal or care for our young. Goodness becomes the deciding factor for whether we follow or reject a given instinct. Hence, it is a confusion in categories to blur an animals obligation to fly south with a person’s obligation to care for his/her young. For these reasons, I suggest that unless you grant a base intelligence to ground the “it just is” of morality, then you have not even entered the realm of moral discourse yet.
I looked back over some of your posts and would be happy to email discourse over the rest of it.
But in short, on point III, it makes sense, once you get down to a basic intelligence, to say “It just is morally good.” Whereas it doesn’t make sense to get down to basic non-intelligent matter, “It just is morally good.” Morality, as far as we have experienced it and known morality, doesn’t apply apart from intelligence. Instinctive emotions, for example, may or may not be morally good–they just exist as instincts (with no comment on morality) and that’s all we can say about them unless we employ some volitional criteria to evaluate whether one should choose to obey or disobey an instinctive emotion.
As for point IV, I focus on objectively binding morality because I find that to be more imporant and central to the subject of moral grounding. I use that nuanced phrasing because relativists and naturalistic objectivists shy away from terms like “absolutism” or simple “objectivism.” When I use “objectively binding” I understand it to be roughly equivalent to “absolute” and “objective” I just specify a key feature of that to defend, namely that a person is morally bound to obey certain rules even if he, his family, his whole culture, or most of history disagrees. This “objectively binding” aspect is what we presume when we pass judgment on foreign cultures like germany or old cultures like the slave-southern states of America. If we presume objective authority for binding moral judgment on a culture that we are not a part of, then we are employing a bigger standard than naturalism can justify. I’m not sure how to answer your alternative proposal, “objectively non-binding morality” except to say that there may be gradations of moral action in some cases where a person does not HAVE to do something but PERMITS something as good. In that sense it’s not “binding” obligating a given action. For example, it’s good to save a drowning child from the water, but certain circumstances might permit abstention as a good option if, 1) you don’t know how to swim, 2) the shark infested waters would certainly kill both of you, and 3) the child was ordered to die that way for the crimes of mass genocide. This category of “non-binding” objective morality however confuses the point I was originally making. Permissive good is just as inexplicable for naturalism as obligatory good. Nature is not intelligent and provides no basis greater than culture for justifying either moral permission or moral obligation since these are the “oughts” which no amount of “is” can broach categorically.
As for your point about exploring the world without presuming a teleological worldview, I have thoughtfully considered that many times before and conclude that Nietzsche’s assessment of reality is the most fitting logical consequence of a non-teleological worldview. It is self-refuting in numerous ways, incoherent, pragmatically self-destructive, and quite depressing. But given the impossibility of design–meaninglessness (semantic, ontic, and epistemic) necessarily follows together with irrationality, atheistic existentialism, universal skepticism, and general hopelessness. Frankly, I’m not compelled at all by non-teleological worldviews and find that one must employ teleology to even hope to account for the most plain and obvious data of experience. I just didn’t go into that whole subject for the sake of time and energy. In my experience, the only people that reject teleology, I found, are people who borrow from it unwittingly because they have not taken there conscious worldview to its logical conclusion.
June 29th, 2010 at 2:22 pm
John,
Sorry for the delay. I have been away at a very time consuming seminar. Aside from that, I’m really trying to make a conscious effort to use my time more productively, and while I enjoy these conversations, and have learned a lot from them, they don’t exactly help feed AIDS orphans in Uganda. (That is, I need to do a better job avoiding what is fun for me, and focus on what’s good for others.) I’ll still pop in here now and then, but I am really trying to avoid these long and drawn out discussions that have little practical effect on anything.
That said, I do want to answer the questions you’ve directly asked of me, at the very least out of politeness.
1. I completely agree with you that no being of which I can conceive which is not intelligent can make moral choices. I think we misunderstood each other (it began with me misunderstanding you).
You said that morality was the stuff of intelligence and I said that in effect this is what you were trying to prove. I took your words there as a reference to G-d, which you seemed not to have intended.
If you believed that morality could come about simply because of intelligence, then G-d would not be needed. Intelligent humans could come up with systems of morality, if that was all it took. Because I know your argument, I jumped to the idea that you were saying G-d’s intelligence was required. Sorry for the confusion. I understand what you said now, and withdraw my comment.
2. No, I am not distinguishing between moral and other oughts. I have tried to clear this up, but you have, as of yet, not given me any reason — at least which I’ve understood — to distinguish between them. This was part of the reason I asked my questions. As I said, you’ve claimed both that instinct follows and ought, and that ought is based on an instinct. From what I see though, even in both of these cases, moral or non-moral, the basics remain.
If one wants to accomplish something one ought to…
So if a bird is to go south it ought to… (as you said)
The same is true of moral oughts as far as I’m concerned (if you’ve demonstrated otherwise, I’ve failed to understand). They are still teleological. They’re trying to accomplish something: do what G-d commands, do what G-d wants, please G-d, whatever one’s reason may be.
If they are not with a purpose then you have the exact problem you’ve called devastating for Nathan, you’re left with a “just because.” There is either a reason, or there’s not one (a just because). If there is a reason, there is a purpose.
If there is a purpose, then it’s the same as the bird going south.
If the bird is to go south it ought…
If the person is to please G-d, s/he ought…
That is why I don’t distinguish, I see all these cases as goal/purpose driven. I am open to seeing it as otherwise, but I see no reason as of yet.
3. We also misunderstood each other on your exploring a non-teleological worldview. It’s not a big deal, but here’s a short explanation, if you’re interested. I was not referring to the worldview as a coherent set of beliefs. I was referring to how morality might be grounded in such a world. You have yourself given very good reasons for believing it could, I just don’t know if you’ve thought about it.
You obviously reject a non-teleological worldview as a whole, but this does not mean that nothing can make sense as an individual component of it. I was stating my belief that you have non fully thought through the way morality might be grounded in a non-teleological world, not that you’ve failed to consider such a world as a coherent system. Even if such a world made no sense in 37 different ways, you could still imagine something working within it, like gravity, for example. Try the same thing for morality.
Anyway, feel free to contact me by email if you wish to discuss these issues more. My door is always open, so to speak.
I would still like to get your answers to questions III and IV from my May 2 post, but it’s not important, just interesting,
Thanks,
Luke